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REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION: A MULTI-TIERED
GOVERNMENTAL APPROACH
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp
104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984)
In March 1980, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an
opinion that "the prohibition of advertising alcoholic beverages
and advertising the sale of alcoholic beverages via regularly broad-
cast television applies similarly to advertising by cable television
companies." 1 The opinion warned of criminal prosecution for any
violation.2 Thereafter, the director of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control Board cautioned cable operators that they would be
criminally prosecuted if they continued to carry out-of-state liquor
advertisements over their system.8 Oklahoma cable companies
brought suit4 for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the
director from enforcing the Oklahoma ban on liquor advertising
against cable operators.5 The cable operators contended that the
state policy violated the commerce and supremacy clauses, the first
and fourteenth amendments, and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma,' found "that the power to regu-
1. 79-334 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 550 (1980).
2. The opinion noted that enforcement of the advertising ban was both a criminal and
civil matter. Violation of the statute would result in license revocation or suspension. Id. at
553.
3. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694, 2698 (1984).
4. Separate suits were filed by various holders of cable franchises and by an associa-
tion of television broadcasters.
5. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII § 5. The article forbids advertising "the sale of an alco-
holic beverage within the State of Oklahoma, except one sign at the retail outlet bearing the
words 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store.'" Additionally, the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to advertise any
alcoholic beverages or the sale of same within the State of Oklahoma, except one
sign at the retail outlet bearing the words 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store,' or any
combination of such words or any of them and no letter in any such sign shall be
more than four (4) inches in height or more than three (3) inches in width, and if
more than one (1) line is used the lines shall not be more than one (1) inch
apart.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1971).
6. Cablecom General, Inc. v. Crisp, No. Civ-81-290 W (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 1982), rev'd
sub horn. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.) cert. granted sub
nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
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late liquor granted to the states by the twenty-first amendment to
the United States Constitution did not override the first amend-
ment rights of telecasters and the cable operators.'" On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit s reversed,
holding that while advertising of alcoholic beverages is commercial
speech entitled to protection under the first and fourteenth
amendments, the state prohibitions were valid restrictions on com-
mercial speech.' On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States held, reversed: (1) The Supreme Court would decide the
question of federal preemption of the Oklahoma ban, even though
the Court of Appeals had not addressed it." The conflict between
Oklahoma and federal law was plainly raised in the complaint and
acknowledged by both lower courts. The district court made find-
ings on all factual issues necessary to resolve the question, and the
parties had briefed and argued the question pursuant to the Su-
preme Court's order. (2) Oklahoma's alcoholic beverages advertis-
ing ban to out-of-state signals carried by cable operators is pre-
empted by federal law of cable signal carriage. Here, the power
delegated to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
under the Communications Act of 1934 plainly comprises all regu-
latory actions necessary to ensure the accomplishment of the
FCC's statutory responsibilities. The result of compliance with the
ban is wholly at odds with the FCC's regulatory goal of making
available the benefits of cable communications on a nationwide ba-
sis. The ban also conflicts with specific federal regulations. Federal
regulations, like federal statutes, can preempt state law. (3) The
twenty-first amendment does not save the advertising ban from
preemption. The state regulation conflicts with the accomplish-
ment and execution of the federal regulatory scheme and the
state's'power to regulate the sale or use of liquor is not directly
7. Oblhoma Telecmde Ainn v. Crisp. 699 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting
C.eldecm General Inc. v. Crip, No. C,.-81-290-W. (W.D. Obla. 1982)).
8. The apelae court decisio comsolidated Okldaoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp,
with Cablecm General Inc. v. Crisp, No. Civ. 81-290 (W.D. Okl. 1981). revd sub non.
Oklahoma Telecasters Am'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983).
9. The appellate mirt applied the test for the validity. of regulation of commual
speech as articulated in Central Hudseon Gas & Electric Corp, v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 447
U.S 557 (1980). 7Ue four pronga of the test am: (1) whether the expression is protected by
the first amendment, (2) whether the oaerted gvrnmental intees is substantial. (3)
whether the regubation directly advances the asserted governmental interest, and (4)
whether the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
la Wile petitioner' petition for certiorari was pending, the Solicitor General, ap-
pearing as aricts curiae on behal of the FCC intervened. He argued the ban on the re-
transmission of out-of-date sigoa significantly interfered with the existing federal frame-
work Capital Cities, 104 S. CL. at 2699.
[Vol. 2:105
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REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION
implicated. The state's interest is not of the same stature as the
FCC's goals and interest in ensuring the widespread availability of
diverse cable services throughout the United States. Additionally,
enforcement of the state statute is barred by the supremacy clause.
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
This note examines the historical and legal development of
government regulation of the cable industry and the development
of a multi-tiered regulatory scheme. It is necessary to consider the
historical precedent leading to the Court's holding that the FCC
has unambiguously expressed its intent to preempt any state or
local regulation of the array of cable signals. The note concludes
with an analysis of the Court's findings and use of administrative
law principles.
The cable industry has rapidly expanded in the past three de-
cades11 from a community antenna television (CATV) system car-
rying only broadcast signals to a high capacity communication sys-
tem. This expansion led to the development of significant policy
and legal issues concerning governmental regulation of cable
broadcasting. During the infancy of cable television services, 12
broadcast television informed and entertained nationwide viewers.
The FCC,13 although aware of the adverse impact cable expansion
could have upon the broadcast television industry, found that im-
pact insignificant and declined to assert jurisdiction over cable
television.' 4
The FCC's initial reluctance to regulate cable television ab-
ruptly changed in the mid 1960's. Television broadcasters faced
with the economic threat posed by cable systems urged the FCC to
assert jurisdiction over the cable industry. The Commission began
its regulation of cable communications with the promulgation of
11. The first cable television system commenced service in Oregon in 1949 and the
first commercial system began operation in 1950 in Lansford, Pennsylvania. These systems
were designed to meet the needs of viewers where television reception was impossible or
inadequate. For more information on this subject see generally, Besen & Crandell, The De-
regulation of Cable Television, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1981); see also Stern, The
Evolution of Cable Television Regulation, 21 UR& L. ANN. 179 (1981).
12. By the end of the 1950's there were 640 systems serving 650,000 subscribers.
Besen, supra note 11, at 81.
13. The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934. The scope of the
Commission's authority has been interpreted broadly to allow the agency to handle new
developments in the communications media. For more information on this subject see gen-
erally, Note, The FCC's Cable Television Jurisdiction: Deregulation by Judicial Fiat, 30 U.
FLA. L. REv. 718 (1978).
14. Since the Communications Act of 1934 was passed long before the advent of cable
television and because its terms are specifically applicable only to common carriers and
broadcasters, the FCC was initially reluctant to regulate cable television. Id. at 730.
1984]
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rules concerning microwave-served CATV in the 1960's. The FCC
asserted broad jurisdiction over cable television at this time" and
continued to expand its regulation over cable services throughout
the decade.16
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,17 the FCC issued
an order restricting the expansion of a cable company service into
a major broadcasting market. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Commission lacked authority under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934,18 to issue such an order. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that the FCC's "authority over all
'interstate.. .communication by wire or radio' permits the regula-
tion of CATV system."" While the Court did not specify the limi-
tations of the Commission's regulatory authority, it did restrict ju-
risdiction to "that reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting. '20
A cable operator subject to the Commission's requirement to
originate programming and to make available facilities for local
production of programs,"2 challenged the FCC's authority to for-
mulate that rule in United States v. Midwest Video Corp." The
Supreme Court applied the "reasonably ancillary" test"3 and found
the regulation preserved and augmented "the integrity of broad-
cast signals" and therefore, was "reasonably ancillary to the effec-
tive performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting. ' 'Y24•
Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video offered guidance to
15. "We have determined... that the Communications Act vests in this agency ap-
propriate rulemaking authority over all CATV systems, including those which do not use
microwave relay service. . ." Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 FCC 683, 685 (1965).
16. See generally Note, supra note 13, at 730 and n. 83.
17. 392 U.S. 167 (1968).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
19. The court acknowledged the FCC's authority to regulate broadcasting and other
communications is derived from the Communications Act of 1934. Southwestern, 392 U.S. at
167.
20. Id. at 178.
21. The rule provided that "no CATV system having 3,500 or more subscribers shall
carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the system also operates to a
significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and has available facilities for local pro-
duction and presentation of programs other than automated services." United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 650, 654 (1972) (quoting 47 CRF § 76.201(a) (1972)).
22. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
23. The Court found the FCC's asserted regulatory authority as sustained by the
Court in Southwestern sufficient to regulate. cable systems so as to promote the objectives
associated with jurisdiction over broadcasting, not merely to protect cable. Id. at 667.
24. Id. at 667.
(Vol. 2:105
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the courts in settling regulatory disputes. In American Civil Liber-
ties Union v. FCC,25 the ACLU challenged the Commission's fail-
ure to impose carrier obligations on cable television access chan-
nels and to limit cablecasting to one owner. The Second Circuit
used both decisions as "markers" indicative of the breadth of the
FCC's authority to regulate CATV,"6 and held the rules to be rea-
sonably ancillary. 27 The appellate court acknowledged that flexibil-
ity was needed in dealing with CATV and that the FCC's "jurisdic-
tion should not be 'rigidly departmentalized into licensing and
public utility functions.' "28
By the 1970's, the cable industry had developed nationwide.
The FCC retreated from federal regulation to encourage experi-
mentation and diversity.29
In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,30 (Midwest I), a cable opera-
tor initiated a jurisdictional challenge to the FCC's 1976 promul-
gated rules requiring cable operators to establish channels for pub-
lic use.31 The Supreme Court distinguished United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., (Midwest 1), and invalidated the access
rules, holding that the 1976 rules were "not reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibili-
ties for the regulation of television broadcasting," and therefore,
were not within the FCC's statutory authority. The access rules
had imposed common carrier obligations on cable operators. The
Court ruled that by imposing such obligations the Commission had
exceeded its jurisdictional limits.3 2 It also expressed concern for
the regulatory burdens of cable operators and recognized the "in-
terests of the cable industry in addition to restricting the scope of
the FCC's authority. 3
25. 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
26. Id. at 1351.
27. The court stated "to hold otherwise would ignore the history of the Commission's
efforts to regulate CATV, be contrary to the unmistakable teaching of the Supreme Court,
and indicate a conviction on our part that the ACLU is right in insisting on common carrier
status now which we do not possess." Id. at 1351.
28. Id. at 1351.
29. Besen, supra note 11, at 102.
30. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
31. Rules required cable television systems that have 3,500 or more subscribers and
carry broadcast signals to develop a 20 channel capacity by 1986 and to provide access by
third parties. Report and Order in Docket No. 20508, 59 FCC 2d 294 (1976), questioned in
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
32. The Court noted Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in United States v.
Midwest Corp., characterizing "the outer limits" of the Commission's jurisdiction. FCC v.
Midwest, 440 U.S. at 708.
33. Stern, supra note 11, at 201 (construing FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
1984]
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Following Midwest II,3' the barriers limiting state participa-
tion in such areas as cable applicant selection and nonbroadcast
channel supervision were removed. 5 Mandatory rules governing
the local franchising process were removed to allow "local authori-
ties and marketplace forces to determine" the cable industry's de-
velopment.3 6 This deregulatory trend has continued into the
1980's. In June 1981, the court in Malrite TV v. FCC,"7 affirmed
the Commission's decision to deregulate cable television by re-
scinding the distant signal and syndicated program exclusivity
rules.38 The court reasoned that the policy concerning deregulation
was "best left to agencies the that were created, in large part, to
resolve them." '3 9
Much of the recent litigation concerning regulation of the
cable industry has involved the extent to which a regulation can be
challenged by asserting the first amendment rights of cable opera-
tors. The focal point of this controversy has been the debate over
whether cable systems should be treated in the same manner and
with the same freedom as newspapers.' The district court, in
Cablecom,41 held that enforcement of Oklahoma's advertising ban
would violate the plaintiff's first amendment rights, and issued
689 (1979)).
34. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
35. Concerned about the unmanageable burden on the FCC that conventional licens-
ing would bring, the Commission gave responsibility to the state and/or local governing bod-
ies for conducting the cable franchising process. See generally be Duc, Control of Cable
Television: The Senseless Assault On States' Rights, 24 CATH. U. L. REv. 795 (1975).
36. FCC rules required the franchising authority to guarantee a public proceeding for
review and selection of cable operation applications, to formulate construction timetables
for future compliance by the cable operator, and to make provisions for local service com-
plaint procedures. For more information see Stern, supra note 11, at 197-98.
37. 652 F.2d 1140 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
38.
Distant signal rules limited the number of signals from distant stations that a
cable system could retransmit to its subscribers, in order to protect local sta-
tions. Syndicated program exclusivity rules authorized local television stations,
which had purchased exclusive exhibition rights to a program, to demand that
local cable systems delete that program from distant signals.
Stern, Krasnow & Senkowski, The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent
Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U. L. Rxv. 592, 582 (1983).
39. Malrite, 652 F.2d at 1147.
40. Other issues being debated are: (i) which functions performed by cable raise issues
of first amendment rights, (ii) precluding cable operators' first amendment rights by federal,
state and local regulation of content, as in the fairness doctrine, and of structure, as in
access requirements, and (iii) effect of contractual agreements on first amendment rights of
cable operators. For more information on this subject see generally, Golberg, Ross &
Spector, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and the First Amendment, 3 COM./ENT.
L. J. 577 (1981).
41. No. Civ. 81-290 (W.D. Okla. 1892).
[Vol. 2:105
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permanent injunctions against the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board and its director, Crisp. The appellate court 42 reversed the
district court's summary judgments and dissolved the permanent
injunctions. The court relied upon an interpretation of a summary
dismissal in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Com-
mission,4 s as controlling precedent. The court also examined the
merits of the case and applied the Central Hudson test for deter-
mining the validity of regulation and commercial speech." The
Tenth Circuit held the advertising to be reasonably related to re-
ducing the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages" and no
more extensive than necessary to serve the state's asserted
interest.41
The Supreme Court chose not to consider the question of the
validity of the restriction on protected commercial speech. 47 In-
stead, the Court declared that there exists a generalized federal
preemption of state regulation of cable.' The Court found that the
advertising ban was not within the public interest, conflicted with
specific federal regulation and was not a permitted police power
under the circumstances. 4 Not even the broad powers of the state
under the twenty-first amendment saved the regulation from
preemption.5 0
First, the supremacy clause of the Constitution 1 provides for
preemption by federal law of a state regulation." In support of this
42. Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d 490.
43. Ohio Supreme Court had upheld a state regulation prohibiting retail liquor permit
holders from advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages against a first amendment
challenge. Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 433 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio
1982) appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 31 (1982).
44. See supra note 9.
45. The court balanced the interests of the state under its police power and the
twenty-first amendment against the lesser protected interests of commercial speech and
concluded that the scales tipped in the state's favor. Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 502.
46. Id. at 502.
47. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. at 2709 n. 16. By avoiding this issue,
the Court has left it to the lower courts to wrestle with the extent of first amendment pro-
tection afforded commercial speech such as advertising. On one side of this controversial
issue are the interests of the cable operators suggesting that cable is entitled to the same
protection as the printed press. On the other side are government interests in diversity and
public access.
48. Id. at 2703.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2707.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
52. A three-step analysis relevant to assessing if such a conflict exists examines: (1) if
Congress in enacting a federal statute has clearly expressed an intent to preempt state law;
(2) if the scheme of federal regulation is so comprehensive as to infer that Congress left no
room for the states to supplement it; and (3) if the enforcement of state law conflicts with
19841
7
Karp: Regulation of Cable Television: A Multi-Tiered Governmental Appro
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
112 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
proposition the Court referred to Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan Assn. v. De La Cuesta" and United States v. Shimer.54
In Fidelity Federal, the Court declared that federal regula-
tions "have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes. Where
Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion,
his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine
whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrar-
ily." ' The Shimer Court stated that an administrator's choice is
not to be disturbed if it "represents a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by
the statute" unless the statute or its legislative history makes it
clear "that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned."5 6 Based on these considerations, the Capital Cit-
ies Court declared a generalized federal preemption of state regula-
tion of cable signal carriage.2
Capital Cities stated that preemption was necessary because
operators would be subject to criminal prosecution under the ban
for actions taken in compliance with specific federal regulations.
The Court identified three areas of conflict: (1) the FCC "must
carry" rules requiring the transmission of broadcast signals in full
without deleting or altering any part, located within a specified 35
mile zone; (2) FCC rulings permitting and encouraging the impor-
tation and retransmission of out-of-state television broadcast sig-
nals to subscribers; and (3) interference with the transmission of
specialized non-broadcast cable services (pay cable), an area under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. 8
The Court also noted that the Copyright Revision Act," pro-
viding for payment of royalties via a compulsory licensing system,
requires a cable operator to refrain from deleting or altering com-
mercial advertising on the broadcast signal it transmits.0 There-
fore, enforcement of the ban was "wholly at odds with the regula-
tory goals contemplated by the FCC,"61 and specifically prohibited
federal law and stands as an obstacle to Congress's purpose and objectives. Capital Cities,
104 S. Ct. at 2700.
53. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
54. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
55. Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 153-54.
56. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383.
57. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
58. Id. at 2703-04.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
60. Id. at 2706.
61. The goal was "to make available as far as possible, to all the people of the United
States a rapid, efficient, nationwide and world-wide wire and radio communications ser-
[Vol. 2:105
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cable's growth and diversity.2
The Court also held that federal preemption was not overrid-
den by the broad powers granted to the states by section 2 of the
twenty-first amendment s to regulate the importation and sale of
alcoholic beverages. As elsewhere, the state's twenty-first amend-
ment powers are to be determined by examining its conflict with
the regulation." The federal government retains substantial au-
thority under the commerce clause" and the first6 and fourteenth
amendments,6 7 despite the state's broad twenty-first amendment
power.
The Court referred to California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn.
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,68 to support its contention that a state's
indirect attempt to regulate the sale or use of liquor within its bor-
ders can be overridden by federal law 96 and the supremacy clause,
where the "unsubstantiated state concerns" were "not of the same
vice. ... 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
62. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2697.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating li-
quors, in violation of the law thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several states, as
provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission
hereof to the states by the Congress.
See Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) (state liquor regulation upheld under broad
police authority of twenty-first amendment that would otherwise be invalid under the Com-
merce Clause); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (constitutionality of gender dis-
criminatory statute questioned with Court noting the twenty-first amendment "created an
exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause.")
64. See e.g., Hostetter v. Idewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964)
(statute regulating liquor for use outside the state invalidated with Court stressing that the
Commerce Clause and the Amendment "each must be considered in light of the other, and
in context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.")
65. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
66. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.. ." The first amendment was made applicable to the States through the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.
67. For more information on the subject see generally Preempting State Action
Taken Pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 590 (1980); Note, The
Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Prohibition On Liquor Advertising, 16 TULSA L. J. 734
(1981).
68. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
69. In Midcal, the Court declared that the twenty-first amendment did not bar appli-
cation of the Sherman Antitrust Act to California's wine pricing system. 445 U.S. at 113-
114.
19841
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stature as the goals of the Sherman Act."'70 The Capital Cities
Court applied Midcal, and made a "'pragmatic effort to harmonize
state and federal powers' within the context of the issues and in-
terests at stake. '71 Noting the "modest nature" of Oklahoma's in-
terest in furthering temperance via the advertising restrictions 7
2
the Court concluded that the balance of power tipped "decisively
in favor of the federal law."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court assumes that the FCC
can define its own jurisdictional boundaries. The reasoning is not
conclusive. The source of analysis is particularly questionable since
the FCC's cable jurisdiction is a judicial creation rather than a
congressional delegation.78 After Southwestern, many authorities
argued that Congress should clarify these jurisdictional lines and
enact legislation establishing a regulatory program with state and
federal cooperation. 4 Congress has not yet acted and in Capital
Cities the Court was faced with the question of analyzing the
proper relationship between the FCC and the states. The Court
held that where the FCC has acted, states are preempted. Thus,
the assumption that the FCC has preempted the regulatory field.
The Capital Cities ruling unequivocably indicates that even in an
era of deregulation, the Court will expand the FCC's jurisdiction
against potential regulatory partners. In effect, the Court has pre-
supposed the precise question at issue in the case.
In its acquiescence to the FCC's preemption of cable, Capital
Cities did not provide the substantial review that the question re-
quired. As one commentator noted: "The Commission's authority
under Southwestern cannot reasonably be argued to extend to re-
strictions on the type or nature of nonfederal cable regulation.
Were the FCC's jurisdiction over cable plenary, perhaps the argu-
ment could be made."'75
When a court grants power to an administrative agency, it es-
70. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2709.
71. Id. at 2708.
72. The Court noted that Oklahoma permits both print and broadcast commercials for
beer. The State also allows alcoholic beverage advertisements in publications printed
outside the state and sold within its borders. Id. at 2709.
73. Judicial creativity includes the court's construction of statutes granting substantial
power to administrative agencies. For a thorough discussion of this topic as applied to ad-
ministrative law see, J. Mallamud, Courts, Statutes and Administrative Agency Jurisdic-
tion: A Consideration of Limits on Judicial Creativity, 35 S. C. L. Rav. 192 (1984).
74. See generally Mahoney, Cable Television's Jurisdictional Dispute, 24 CATH. U. L.
REv. 872 (1975).
75. Id. at 878.
[Vol. 2:105
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tablishes law and by-passes the legislature.76 As a result, the FCC
has obtained and utilized "substantial power, no less effectively
than if the legislature had directed the agency to act 'in the public
interest.' , At issue here are constraints on this power. Since this
judicially created power leaves the agency without the policy
guidelines that normally follow a Congressional delegation, "[o]nce
the court grants jurisdiction to the agency, the question of whether
the court or the agency will make specific policy arises. '
In a political system based on separation of powers it is essen-
tial that the judiciary and administrative agencies do not usurp the
powers of Congress. In the cable regulatory arena, it is the FCC
that has encroached on the congressional powers. The Court's re-
view should have been more than an acquiescence to the adminis-
trative agency's ruling on the matter.
Capital Cities relied on Fidelity Federa7 9 as precedent for the
proposition that federal regulations have the same preemptive
power as federal statutes.80 The Court applied the Shimer test of
"reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies" 81 to the federal
regulation at issue. The Court reasoned that since the FCC had
resolved to preempt an area of cable regulation and that determi-
nation represented a "reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies" within the agency's domain, then all conflicting state reg-
ulations were precluded. 2
The underlying tensions evident in Shimer are a sharp con-
trast to those in the instant case. In Shimer, the Veterans Admin-
istration was seeking subrogation and indemnification from an in-
dividual for an amount paid as guarantor on a defaulted loan. The
Court held the United States was entitled to be indemnified by the
veteran pursuant to Veterans Administration regulations which
were reasonable, even though the applicable Pennsylvania statute
released the guarantor under certain conditions. The regulations
were held to be a valid exercise of the authority granted to the
76. Mallamud states that as a general rule, courts, including the United States Su-
preme Court, should not grant jurisdiction to administrative agencies. Mallamud, supra
note 73, at 292.
77. Id. at 267.
78. Id. at 267.
79. Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
80. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2700.
81. "If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that
were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it ap-
pears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that
Congress would have sanctioned." Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383.
82. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2701.
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administrator."3
While Shimer dealt with the interest of a private individual, in
Capital Cities a significant state interest is at issue; the will of the
citizens of the state as articulated by a representative body. The
prohibition at issue in Capital Cities was enacted by duly elected
representatives of Oklahoma citizens. The state legislators passed
the statute, which was supported by the majority of their constitu-
ents, in an attempt to control intrastate affairs. It is not clear why
the Court in Capital Cities should apply the Shinter rule and ad-
here to the urgings of the FCC over the legislative mandate of the
people of the state.
The Capital Cities Court also relied on a portion of the test
articulated in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.84
The test is applied when there is preemption of a state regulation
by a federal regulation. The Florida Lime Court held:
The principle to be derived from our decision is that federal reg-
ulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive
of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive rea-
sons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter per-
mits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakenly
so ordained."s
The fact that Congress has as yet failed to establish a cable
television policy and to have specifically delegated power to the
FCC, precludes analysis via the congressional delegation prong."
The Court's opinion leads one to believe that such an analysis is
applicable in the instant case. The Court analyzed the Copyright
Revision Act of 197687 and accorded great deference to the accom-
panying legislative history."
The Court referred to legislative intent in the Copyright Act
in determining that a clear conflict existed between the state ac-
tion and the congressional delegation. The respondent's brief ar-
gued this point,8 ' noting that "Congress has not intentionally pre-
83. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 385.
84. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
85. Id. at 142.
86. As one commentator stated: "the Commission's assumption of jurisdiction over
cable has resulted from judicial interpretation of the Act, rather than from express congres-
sional directive. It is the judiciary which has ultimately determined the critical issues in the
broadcast cable dispute." Mallamud, supra note 73, at 266.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
88. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2706.
89. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 50, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S.
Ct. 2694 (1984).
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empted this field so as to forbid states from exercising their
twenty-first amendment powers.90 The language of the 1976 Copy-
right Act is evidence of Congress' intent to only preempt state laws
creating the same rights as those created by the Copyright Act, not
to totally occupy the field.9' Since Oklahoma's law did not create
any right identical to those found in the Copyright Act it should
.not be preempted where a state is empowered to regulate for the
public health and safety of its citizens.92
The use of a copyright legislative history as a rationale for pre-
emption in the instant case is unfounded. Where Congress has not
directly made known its intent, it is insufficient to seek out indi-
rectly related statutes to serve as congressional approval. While de-
ciding whether to impose a rule of evidence on state courts, the
Court in Schwartz v. State of Texas,9" stated: "It will not be.pre-
sumed that a federal statute was intended to supercede the exer-
cise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation
of intention to do so. The exercise of federal preemption is not
lightly to be presumed.""
Had Capital Cities applied the complete Florida Lime test,
the Court probably would not have preempted the state regulation.
Under the Florida Lime test for preemption, the subject matter
must be "a subject by its very nature admitting only of national
supervision.' 95 The subject must demand exclusive federal regula-
tion in order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests,' or
there must be evidence of congressional intent to exclusively oc-
cupy the field,' 7 or it must be shown as a practical matter that
both regulations cannot be enforced "without impairing the federal
superintendence of the field.""
Insightful here is Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in
Optometry." In Head, the state enacted an advertising prohibition
to assure a high standard of professional competence. The regula-
90. Id. at 54.
91. Id. at 54.
92. Id. at 59.
93. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
94. Id. at 202-03. Accord Reid v. State of Colorado, '187 U.S. 137 (1902). "It should
never be held that Congress intends to supercede or by its legislation suspend, the exercise
of the police powers of the states, even when it may do so unless its purpose to effect that
result is clearly manifested."
95. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 143.
96. Id. at 144.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
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tion prohibited the advertising of prices connected with the prac-
tice of optometry.' The Supreme Court upheld the state regula-
tion as a valid enactment designed to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens. The Court rejected the appellant's claim
that the regulation of radio advertising had been preempted by the
Communications Act of 1934. As noted by respondent's brief in
Capital Cities,10' the Court concluded "the Communications Act
had plainly evidenced no congressional intention to totally oust
state regulatory authority in areas also regulated under the Act."'0 2
The Capital Cities Court distinguished Head. The Head
Court stated: "no specific federal regulation even remotely in con-
flict with the New Mexico law has been called to our attention.
Here, by contrast, the FCC's preemptive intent could not be more
explicit or unambiguous. '"103 The issue in Capital Cities, however,
was not whether there was a specific regulation on point; but
whether the subject matter requires preemption. Justice Brennan,
in his concurring opinion in Head,' " applied the Florida Lime
test. '0  He stated that the "subject matter, here radio and televi-
sion broadcasting, is not one 'by its very nature admitting only of
national supervision.' Nothing in our decisions which have re-
quired particular state regulations to yield to the Communications
Act, suggest such a view of the regulatory field."'"
In assessing the exclusivity of federal regulation to control the
field and, to achieve uniformity, Brennan asserted:
that language should not be read as construing the Communica-
tions Act to mandate the ouster of all local regulation the appli-
cation of which might in any way prevent national uniform-
ity .... Rather than mandate ouster of state regulations, several
100. The statute at issue in Head prohibits:
(m)Advertising by any means whatsoever the quotation of any prices or terms on
eyeglasses, spectacles, lenses, frames or mountings, or which quotes discount
to be offered on eyeglasses, spectacles, lenses, frames or mountings or which
quotes 'moderate prices,' 'low prices,' 'lowest prices,' guaranteed glasses,'
'satisfaction guaranteed,' or words of similar import.
The purpose of this provision according to the Supreme Court of New Mexico, is to
"protect * * * citizens against the evils of price-advertising methods tending to satisfyee the
needs of their pocketbooks rather than the remedial requirements of their eyes." New Mex-
ico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Roberts, 70 N.M. 90, 94, 370 P.2d 811, 813 (1962).
101. Supra note 88, at 50.
102. Id. at 50.
103. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2694 n. 10.
104. Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 443 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 442.
106. Id.
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provisions of the Communications Act suggest a congressional
design to leave standing various forms of state
regulation .... 107
While discussing the detailed regulation of some broadcasting
practices, he additionally noted that "the failure expressly to regu-
late non-deceptive advertising surely does not deprive the FCC of
all such jurisdiction, that failure argues against a congressional de-
sign that state regulation was to be ousted. '108
Questioning whether "both regulations can be enforced with-
out impairing the federal superintendence of the field,"' " Brennan
noted that the legislation of the nature and subject matter dealt
with in Head and Capital Cities, specifically, the health and safety
of citizens, "embodies a traditional state interest of the sort which
our decisions have consistently respected. Nor is such legislation
required to yield simply because it may in some degree restrict the
activities of one who holds a federal license." 110
Where the agency acts on the basis of a congressional delega-
tion, a "court retains the power to review agency decision-making
along a continuum of deference, from superficial review to close
scrutiny." ' The Capital Cities Court, in determining the stan-
dard of judicial review, chose the superficial standard as articu-
lated in Shimer. It used the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to
determine whether the administrator exceeded his statutory au-
thority in exercising his discretion.'12 While the Court proclaimed
to adhere to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, a simple fac-
tual analysis will not support the Court's decision. The FCC's deci-
sion to defeat the legislative mandate of Oklahoma citizens based
on a vague standard such as furthering the development of cable in
the public interest,118 was arbitrary and capricious. Even under the
very limited review provided for by the Court in the instant case, it
is clear the administrator's rules do not represent "a reasonable
10. Id. at 443.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 97.
110. Head, 374 U.S. at 445.
111. Supro note 73, at 267.
112. Where Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties
requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether it
involve questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the courts unless he has
exceeded his authority or this court should be of opinion that his action was
clearly wrong.
Id. at 382.
113. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. 2702 n. 8.
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accommodation of conflicting policies."' 4
The rationale of the earlier courts in establishing jurisdiction
"reasonably ancillary to the Commission's various responsibilities
for the regulation of television broadcasting"'" 5 does not support
the extent of judicial deference used in Capital Cities. A primary
purpose of the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction over the cable indus-
try was the protection of local broadcast television services. " 6 Tel-
evision broadcasters, fearful of the economic threat posed by cable
operators, sought refuge under the jurisdictional arm of the FCC.
While earlier rules reflected this protectionist policy," 7 the Capital
Cities decision is directly opposed to this rationale. While the
Court struck the advertising ban as it pertained to cable broadcast
signals, it allowed the prohibition to stand as applied to television
broadcast signals. The ruling has imposed an economic burden
upon television broadcasters competing for the same advertisers as
cable broadcasters.
Cable, a technological development labelled as "ancillary" to
television broadcast, has now assumed the predominant position.
This decision implies that protection of broadcast services is not of
the concern in the 1980's that it was in the 1960's. " 8 Preemption is
intended to foster diversity in satellite delivered program services
by freeing cable systems from burdensome regulations.1 9 The
Court clearly indicates its support of the FCC's design to allow
"breathing space necessary to expand vigorously" nationwide cable
services. 20
The Court makes no mention of the effect of expansion on reg-
ular broadcast services. The Court is implicitly making a choice
between cable and broadcast services by deferring to the FCC's
judgment. If marketplace forces are to determine the future expan-
114. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383.
115. 392 U.S. at 178.
116. For example, a major objective of the broadcast carriage rule was to:
insure at least a minimum of service in undeserved areas, set limits to the im-
pact of cable distant signal carriage on over-the-air broadcasting, and eliminate
certain elements of competitive unfairness resulting from the fact that cable sys-
tems are not required under existing copyright laws to. pay for the television
broadcast programming they pick up and distribute. . . and to promote service
attuned to the needs and interests of the cable community.
Notes, The FCC's Cable Television Jurisdiction: Deregulation by Judicial Fiat, 30 U. FLA.
L. REv. 718, 726 (1978).
117. The FCC enacted rules to protect local broadcast television while fostering the
development of cable systems.
118. 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
119. 104 S. Ct. at 2702 n. 9.
120. 104 S. Ct. at 2705.
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sion of competition between cable and broadcast services, it is im-
portant that this choice is not predetermined by any previous in-
clination of the FCC.
The Court implies with its holding, that given the nature of
the subject matter, partnership in this area is impossible. The deci-
sion can be read as a warning to states that the current relaxation
.of federal controls is not to be read as an invitation for states to
step into the regulatory scheme.' The Court narrows the localism
policy'22 previously developed to include only state regulation of
local aspects such as franchisee selection and construction
oversight.23
Congress is speaking to this issue in the current session and
does not join in the FCC's determination of allocation of regulatory
power. Congress' intent to establish a regulatory sharing 2 4 at fed-
eral and nonfederal levels in the cable area is evidenced by the
Senate's passage of the proposed Cable Telecommunications Act of
1983.12' The Act amends the Communications Act of 1934 to spe-
cifically establish a national policy concerning cable television and
to establish guidelines for the exercise of regulatory authority.' 6
To encourage a more competitive environment for cable systems,
the Senate bill calls for a definitive jurisdictional framework.
Within the framework, "local government will be given the author-
ity over areas of local concern and authorizes them to protect local
needs.' 21 7 Section 2(c) of the Act states: ". . .any State or political
subdivision or agency thereof, or franchising authority, may exer-
121. FCC policy as articulated by Mark Fowler, the current chairman of the FCC, calls
for marketplace forces to "spur on innovation, experimentation, and risk-taking," while pro-
tecting the public interest. He calls for "unregulation" so that "the marketplace rather than
the myths of trusteeship approach determines what programming the American people re-
ceive." Fowler, Foreward, 32 CATH. U. L Pav. 523, 527 (1983).
122. For a discussion of other policy themes in the FCC's regulation of cable television
with no direct bearing on this discussion see NOTES, supra note 115, at 718.
123. 104 S. Ct. at 2702.
124. Cooperative regulatory schemes have developed in other regulated areas. The
state-federal partnership concepts have arisen to balance the needs of local concern while
protecting the federal interest. One such example that may have bearing on the cable indus-
try is OSHA's approach to state option programs, offering financial assistance for develop-
ment and enforcement at the state level of articulated national objectives. States are en-
couraged to assume full responsibility for implementing state-national objectives in the
occupational safety and health field. The FCC's cable television jurisdiction could likewise
be supplanted by state implementation of national objectives as articulated by Congress.
The Act, however, does not provide for total displacement of federal authority, although it
is substantial. Mahoney, supra note 74 at 892 n. 111.
125. S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rac. S. 8325 (June 14, 1983).
126. S. REP. No. 98-67, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983).
127. Id. at 11.
19841
17
Karp: Regulation of Cable Television: A Multi-Tiered Governmental Appro
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
122 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
cise jurisdiction over matters which are reasonably necessary for
the reasons of public health, safety, and welfare.' 28 A similar bill
is awaiting passage in the House. 129
As suggested by the legislative intent of the pending law, the
Court's application of preemption by the federal government via a
regulatory agency is not the only answer. States must be afforded
the opportunity of becoming a nonfederal regulatory partner. Max-
imum participation by the states in the regulatory process on the
local level will assure that cable programming truly reflects com-
munity needs and desires. State action in a dual regulatory scheme
"will curb abuses at the local level and foster growth of cable sys-
tems in the public interest."130
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Capital Cities has
created certainty in the area of the scope of the FCC's regulation,
it will be a cause for concern in the area of regulatory administra-
tive law. The Court's failure to limit the FCC's open ended ancil-
lary jurisdiction will frustrate the effectuation of a dual regulatory
scheme with the state as an active participant. The FCC's policy
making as prescribed by an overextension of a judicially creative
interpretation is not likely to produce the best cable regulation
policy.
Judith R. Karp
128. S. 66, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S 8325 (June 14, 1983).
129. H.R. REP. No. 4103, 98th Cong., Ist Seas. (1983).
130. Stern, supra note 11, at 215.
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